The Sense of Joint Agency in Joint Action by Bolt, Nicole Karen 1991-
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THE SENSE OF JOINT AGENCY  
IN JOINT ACTION 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the College of  
Graduate Studies and Research 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
for the Degree of Master of Arts 
in the Department of Psychology 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon 
 
 
by 
Nicole Bolt 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© Copyright Nicole Bolt, September 2016. All rights reserved.
 i 
PERMISSION TO USE 
In presenting this thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for a Postgraduate degree from 
the University of Saskatchewan, I agree that the Libraries of the University may make it freely 
available for inspection. I further agree that permission for copying of this thesis in any manner, 
in whole or in part, for scholarly purposes may be granted by the professor or professors who 
supervised my thesis work or, in their absence, by the Head of the Department or the Dean of the 
College in which my thesis work was done. It is understood that any copying or publication or 
use of this thesis or parts thereof for financial gain shall not be allowed without my written 
permission. It is also understood that due recognition shall be given to me and to the University 
of Saskatchewan in any scholarly use which may be made of any material in my thesis.  
 
Requests for permission to copy or to make other uses of materials in this thesis in whole or part 
should be addressed to: 
 
Head of the Department of Psychology 
University of Saskatchewan 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A5 
Canada 
 
OR  
 
Dean 
College of Graduate Studies and Research 
University of Saskatchewan 
107 Administration Place 
Saskatoon, Saskatchewan S7N 5A2 
Canada  
 ii 
ABSTRACT 
The sense of agency refers to the feeling of generating and controlling actions and their 
effects. Philosophers have proposed that when people coordinate their actions with others they 
may experience a sense of joint agency, or shared control over actions and their effects. However, 
little empirical work has investigated the sense of joint agency. Therefore, the primary goal of the 
present research was to directly examine people’s experiences of joint agency. In a series of 
experiments, we manipulated factors hypothesized to influence joint agency, and employed rating 
scales that asked participants specifically about their experience of joint agency. In Experiment 1, 
pairs of people coordinated their actions to produce tone sequences and then rated their sense of 
joint agency on a scale ranging from shared to independent control. People felt more shared than 
independent control overall, confirming that people experience joint agency during joint action. 
Furthermore, people felt stronger joint agency when they: a) produced sequences that required 
mutual coordination compared to sequences in which only one partner had to coordinate with the 
other, and b) held the role of follower compared to leader. Because joint agency is thought to 
include not only a sense of shared control over a continuous action, but also a sense of shared 
responsibility for action outcomes, in Experiment 2 we examined whether the same factors would 
influence people’s sense of shared responsibility for joint action outcomes. Participants rated 
their responsibility on a scale with endpoints indicating they were responsible (self-
responsibility) or their partner was responsible (other-responsibility), and a midpoint indicating 
they both were responsible (shared responsibility). People felt more shared responsibility for 
correct outcomes and more self-responsibility for incorrect outcomes, regardless of the type of 
coordination or role they held within the joint action. Finally, in Experiment 3 we examined 
whether the predictability of a partner’s actions influenced the sense of shared control. Each 
participant coordinated with two confederate partners, the timing of whose actions was 
manipulated so that one partner’s actions were highly predictable in time and the other’s less 
predictable. People felt more shared control when they coordinated with the more predictable 
partner, even after controlling for joint performance accuracy and variability of the participant’s 
action timing. The results from these three experiments indicate that the sense of joint control is 
driven by people’s predictions about their partner’s actions, whereas joint responsibility is more 
strongly influenced by outcome valence. These finding have implications for theories of joint 
agency as well as our understanding of self-agency and everyday joint action.  
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CHAPTER 1 
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SENSE OF JOINT AGENCY IN JOINT ACTION 
 
Portions of this chapter are based on the following journal manuscripts: 
Bolt, N. K., Poncelet, E. M., Schultz, B. G., Loehr, J. D. (2016). Mutual coordination strengthens 
the sense of joint agency in cooperative joint action. Manuscript submitted to 
Consciousness and Cognition.  
 
Bolt, N. K., & Loehr, J. D. (2016). The predictability of a partner’s actions modulates the sense 
of joint agency. Manuscript submitted to Cognition. 
 
The sense of agency refers to the feeling of generating and controlling actions and their 
effects (Haggard & Tsakiris, 2009). For example, when someone turns on a light, they have a 
sense of agency over flicking the light switch and causing the light to come on. Previous research 
has shown that the sense of agency is driven by both predictive processes (e.g., internal 
predictions about an action based on an efference copy) and postdictive inferences (e.g., visual 
feedback about the consequences of an action) at different levels of action specification (Moore 
& Haggard, 2008; Pacherie, 2008; Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Voss, 2013). However, most research 
on the sense of agency has focused on individuals performing tasks alone. Little research has 
investigated agency during joint action, when two or more individuals coordinate their actions to 
achieve a shared goal (Sebanz, Bekkering, & Knoblich, 2006). Philosophers have proposed that 
the experience of agency during joint action might be substantially different than during solo 
action (e.g., Pacherie, 2012). In addition to experiencing a sense of self-agency over actions and 
their effects (e.g., a sense that “I did it”), people may also experience a sense of joint agency over 
actions and effects (e.g., a sense that “we did it”). To date, no research has examined the sense of 
joint agency during joint action. The sense of joint agency may rely on similar cues as self-
agency. However, these cues need to be understood not only as they pertain to one’s own actions, 
but also in relation to a co-performer’s actions and/or the joint action as a whole. Using insight 
from empirical investigations of self-agency and joint action, and theoretical work on the sense of 
joint agency, the current research offers the first investigation into people’s experience of joint 
agency when they engage in cooperative joint action. 
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Self-agency: Cues and Cue Integration 
Researchers have investigated a number of potential cues that people use to determine 
their sense of self-agency over actions and effects. These cues range from low-level sensorimotor 
information to cognitive inferences about action production (Pacherie, 2008). Two main theories, 
the comparator model (CM; Frith, Blakemore, & Wolpert, 2000) and Wegner’s theory of 
apparent mental causation (AMC; Wegner, 2002), attempt to classify these cues and provide an 
explanation for how they contribute to the sense of self-agency. These theories, and recent 
frameworks that integrate these two theories, are discussed next.  
According to the CM, the sense of self-agency relies on congruence between private 
sensorimotor predictions generated about an action, and the actual consequences of the action 
(Blakemore, Frith, & Wolpert, 1999; Frith et al., 2000). Predictions are generated via forward 
models of action control (Wolpert & Flanagan, 2001; Wolpert, Ghahramani, Jordan, 1995). 
When a person initiates an action, a motor signal is sent from the brain to produce the action. 
Simultaneously, an efference (forward predictor) copy of this motor signal is triggered that 
simulates the consequences of the motor signal. The internal prediction is compared to the actual 
sensory feedback from an action (reafference). The closer the match between the internal 
prediction and the actual sensory consequences, the stronger the sense of self-agency one feels. 
On the other hand, when there is a mismatch, people’s sense of self-agency is reduced and they 
may attribute the action and/or effect to an external cause. Central to the CM is the sensorimotor 
predictive component (Synofzik, 2015). Sensorimotor information is only available when an 
action is internally generated. Therefore, it provides an important signal for determining if an 
outcome is the result of one’s own actions. Evidence for the CM account of agency comes from 
the finding that disrupting the consequences of an action, for example, by increasing the temporal 
delay or altering the expected frequency of a tone elicited by an action, disrupts the sense of self-
agency (Sato & Yasuda, 2005).  
However, private sensorimotor information may not be necessary to make predictions 
about the consequences of an action and develop a sense of self-agency (Knoblich & Repp, 2009; 
Pacherie, 2008). Typically, when sensorimotor information is present, perceptual information 
about our movements (e.g., visual or auditory feedback about where our hand is in space) is also 
available. Therefore, people may use perceptual information to make predictions about the 
consequences of an action and compare these predictions to actual consequences to determine 
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their sense of self-agency. Evidence for this claim comes from a study by Knoblich and Repp 
(2009). In a series of experiments, people had to distinguish between self- and externally-
produced tones during active tapping and during passive listening to a previously recorded trial. 
People were better at discriminating self-produced actions from externally-produced actions 
when both sensorimotor and perceptual cues were available (i.e., when they were actively 
tapping), but could still make the discrimination when sensorimotor information was not 
available (i.e., when passively listening to tones they had previously produced). In the latter case, 
the researchers found that people used perceptual information, such as tempo changes, to 
discriminate self- from externally-produced tones. Together, these findings suggest that both 
sensorimotor and perceptual cues contribute to people’s sense of self-agency (Knoblich & Repp, 
2009; Pacherie, 2008).  
The theory of AMC claims that cognitive inferences and beliefs about action causation 
underlie the sense of self-agency rather than low-level sensorimotor or perceptual predictions 
(Wegner, 2002). According to this theory, agency arises from the congruence between a prior 
thought and an observed action when the thought/intention occurs before the action (priority), is 
consistent with the action (consistency), and there are no alternative causes for the action 
(exclusivity). In line with this theory, Wegner and Wheatley (1999) demonstrated that the timing 
of a thought in relation to an action influences the sense of self-agency. People felt more self-
agency over having caused a cursor to stop on an object when they heard a word describing that 
object immediately prior to its appearance on screen, compared to hearing the word further in 
advance or immediately after the appearance of the object (Wegner & Wheatley, 1999). 
Additionally, increasing the consistency between an action and its outcome by presenting primes 
that were congruent with the action outcome decreased the perceived interval between the action 
and the effect (i.e., the intentional binding phenomenon; Moore, Wegner, and Haggard, 2009). 
Although intentional binding has been interpreted as an implicit measure of self-agency, the 
degree to which it correlates with explicit judgments of self-agency remains unclear (Dewey & 
Knoblich, 2014). However, even if intentional binding is not equivalent to explicit judgments of 
self-agency, it could still contribute to the experience of agency and causality (Gentsch & 
Synofzik, 2014). Taken together, these studies suggest that people’s self-agency for an action 
depends on the congruence between their prior thoughts and subsequent consequences of the 
action.   
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In the past decade, it has become apparent that neither the CM nor the theory of AMC can 
alone account for the sense of self-agency (Pacherie, 2007). No single cue is powerful enough to 
explain self-agency under all conditions (Synofzik, Vosgerau, & Linder, 2009). Instead, the sense 
of self-agency may be better explained by a combination of these accounts. Pacherie (2008) 
proposes that the experience of self-agency relies on the congruence between predicted and actual 
consequences at all three levels of action specification: sensorimotor, perceptual, and cognitive. 
Furthermore, other researchers have proposed that these cues are integrated in the brain by 
optimal cue integration, whereby predictions and consequences at each level of action 
specification are weighted depending their reliability and availability, and are used in 
combination to establish the most accurate agency representation (Moore & Haggard, 2008; 
Synofzik et al., 2009; Synofzik & Voss, 2010). For example, if a force is applied to a person’s 
finger by an experimenter using a cord and pulley beneath a keyboard to initiate a button press, 
sensorimotor information used to generate the action is absent, and cognitive information, such as 
a prime presented before the action, is given more weight in determining one’s sense of self-
agency over the effect (Moore et al., 2009). Cue integration may also be influenced by emotional 
and attentional factors (Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014). For example, people display a self-serving 
bias whereby they are more likely to take responsibility for successful outcomes compared to 
unsuccessful outcomes (Mezulis, Abramson, Hyde, & Hankin, 2004; Miller & Ross, 1975). 
Intentional binding is also greater for positive compared to negative outcomes (Takahata et al., 
2012; Yoshie & Haggard, 2013). These findings suggest that cues are weighted differently 
depending on their valence, possibly because people pay more attention to expected successful 
outcomes compared to unsuccessful outcomes to promote positive self-concept (Gentsch & 
Synofzik, 2014).  
In sum, people derive their sense of self-agency from a multiplicity of cues at different 
levels of action specification (sensorimotor, perceptual, and cognitive). Congruence between the 
predicted and actual effects at each level of action specification strengthens the sense of self-
agency (Pacherie, 2008). Furthermore, these predictive and postdictive cues receive different 
weight in their contribution to the sense of self-agency depending on their reliability, availability, 
and valence (Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; Moore & Haggard, 2008). Pacherie (2012) proposes that 
these cues might also play a role in deriving a sense of joint agency. However, joint agency is 
more complex than self-agency because joint actions require people to predict the consequences 
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of their partner’s actions and the joint action, in addition to predicting the consequences of their 
own actions (Pacherie, 2012). The next section discusses how people make these predictions 
during joint action. 
Joint Action: Representation, Prediction, and Integration 
Perception and action are closely linked (Prinz, 1997), and this close link allows people to 
match the actions they perceive onto their own motor repertoire. Evidence for this claim was first 
demonstrated in monkeys, whereby groups of neurons (referred to as mirror neurons) were found 
to fire both when the monkey executed an action and when the monkey perceived an 
experimenter producing that action (Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogassi, 1996). In humans, 
similar brain regions are active when an action is executed and perceived (Rizzolatti & 
Craighero, 2004). For example, watching someone produce complex dance movements activates 
the observer’s action system, and this activation is further facilitated when the observer has 
previous experience performing such movements (Calvo-Merino, Glaser, Grezes, Passingham, & 
Haggard, 2005). In the context of joint action, close links between perception and action allow 
people to represent others’ actions in equivalent ways as their own actions, even when attending 
to their partner’s actions is not necessary to the joint goal (Sebanz, Knoblich, & Prinz, 2003).  
Keller, Novembre, and Loehr (in press) propose an integrated model of action production 
that includes internal models for self-, other-, and jointly-produced action effects. The internal 
model for self-produced actions is the same as the forward model of action control discussed in 
the previous section. This model runs in parallel with the internal model for other-produced 
actions, whereby other people’s actions are predicted by motor simulation and compared to the 
consequences of their actions (Wilson & Knoblich, 2005; Wolpert, Doya, & Kawato, 2003). The 
internal model for other-produced actions allows people to adjust their own actions based on any 
discrepancies between internal predictions and actual consequences of their partner’s actions, 
thereby facilitating interpersonal coordination (van der Steen & Keller, 2013). Evidence for the 
claim that people predict both their own and others’ actions using parallel internal models comes 
from the finding that people show the same neural responses to altered auditory feedback elicited 
by their own and their partner’s key presses during synchronized duet music performance (Loehr, 
Kourtis, Vesper, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2013). People are also better able to coordinate with co-
performers whose actions are more similar to their own (Loehr & Palmer, 2011; Zamm, 
Wellman, & Palmer, 2016). Furthermore, Kourtis, Sebanz, & Knoblich (2013) showed that 
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predictions of other people’s actions are modulated by social interaction. They had pairs of 
participants engage in a cooperative coordination task while being monitored by 
electroencephalography (EEG). Anticipatory motor activity was stronger when people anticipated 
an interaction partner’s action execution, compared to when they anticipated a non-partner’s 
action execution. Thus, the degree to which people simulate their partner’s actions depends on 
their social relationship with that partner.  
Keller et al.’s (in press) model also proposes that the internal models for self and other 
interact to form an internal model for joint actions. Predicted states for self and other are 
combined to form a joint predicted state, and this is compared to the combined joint 
consequences that result from self- and other-produced actions. Vesper, Knoblich, & Sebanz 
(2014) provided evidence for this component of the model by having participants imagine 
jumping to a target alone or synchronizing their landing times with a partner. The duration of a 
participant’s own imagined jump was influenced by the distance of their partner’s imagined 
jump. This finding suggests that people can integrate different simulations in joint action, and use 
these to adjust their own actions. According to Keller et al., the main purpose of the internal 
model for joint actions is to anticipate and correct for errors in joint action before they occur.  
In sum, people represent and predict self- and other-produced actions using parallel 
internal models during cooperative joint action. According to Keller et al. (in press), predictions 
and consequences for self- and other- produced actions are integrated to make predictions about 
the joint action. These joint-predictions are then compared to consequences that result from the 
joint action. Philosophers have proposed that the sense of joint agency relies upon predictions of 
others’ actions and the joint action (Pacherie, 2012, 2014). The next section discusses these 
theoretical accounts of joint agency in joint action. 
Philosophical Accounts of Joint Agency 
Gallotti and Frith (2013) proposed that when people coordinate their actions, they engage 
in a collective mode of cognition called the we-mode. The main idea of the we-mode is that co-
performers represent their actions as something they are going to pursue together, as a single unit. 
This way of cognizing is hypothesized to enlarge people’s potential for action by giving them 
access to more information about their partners’ behavior than they would have as mere 
disembodied observers. This information provides new possibilities for action, allowing people to 
bring about actions and effects they could not accomplish individually and expanding their 
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agency scope (Pacherie, 2012). For example, two people may be able to lift a heavy object that 
neither person could lift alone.  
Cognition in the we-mode may lead to feelings of joint agency (Dewey, Pacherie, & 
Knoblich, 2014). Dokic (2010) defines joint agency as “the perceptual sense that we are acting 
together” (p. 40). Similarly, Seeman (2009) proposes that joint action will involve “a sense of 
acting together … [which] amounts to a sense of joint control” (p. 504). Pacherie (2012) provides 
the most specific definition of joint agency, describing it as the sense that one’s contribution to a 
joint goal is equal to the contributions of one’s co-performers and that one’s coordination 
relations with co-performers are relatively symmetrical. Pacherie proposes that joint agency may 
be experienced in two forms: shared agency, whereby people experience a sense of joint agency 
along with an intact sense of self-agency, and we-agency, whereby the experience of joint agency 
is accompanied by a reduction in self-agency. We-agency is thought to be experienced when co-
performers produce similar actions with similar effects and synchronous timing. For example, 
soldiers marching in step may experience a loss of self-agency as their actions become one with 
the group (McNeill, 1995). However, most everyday joint actions are thought to involve shared 
agency, as they typically require people to produce coordinated yet distinct and complementary 
actions.  
Pacherie (2012) proposes an integrative framework for how people experience joint 
agency. Similar to self-agency, she proposes that joint agency relies on a match between 
predicted and actual consequences at three levels of action specification: cognitive, perceptual, 
and sensorimotor. However, this becomes much more complex in joint action because people 
must not only predict the consequences of their own actions (self-predictions) at these three 
levels, but also the consequences of their partner’s actions (other-predictions) and their combined 
actions (joint-predictions) at each level of action specification. Overall, then, the sense of joint-
agency relies on congruence between joint-predictions and effects, which in turn relies on the 
accuracy of self- and other-predictions. Internal models that extend to joint action allow people to 
compare other- and joint-predictions with actual outcomes at different levels of action 
specification (Keller et al., in press). However, because people have access to perceptual but not 
sensory reafferent information about their partners’ actions, perceptual and cognitive outcomes 
likely have a greater role than sensorimotor predictions in the experience of agency during joint 
action (Pacherie, 2012; van der Wel & Knoblich, 2013).  
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Pacherie (2012) also describes different factors that might influence people’s sense of 
joint agency by impacting their ability to make accurate predictions at the three levels of action 
specification. First, joint agency is expected to be influenced by whether a joint action is 
egalitarian or hierarchal in structure. Specifically, if contributions to the joint action are equal, 
partners share knowledge about each other’s tasks and how they contribute to the joint goal, 
increasing the congruence of people’s cognitive predictions and strengthening the sense of joint 
agency. Second, joint agency is expected to be influenced by the scale of a joint action. In small-
scale joint actions (with fewer people), people are able to monitor what their co-performers are 
doing and what the perceptual consequences of their actions are, increasing the congruence of 
their perceptual predictions. Another factor is the distribution of roles in the joint action. When 
co-performers have nearly identical and interchangeable roles, they can form more accurate 
sensorimotor predictions about their partner’s actions. However, even small differences in the 
salience of people’s roles may weaken their sense of joint agency. For example, the person who 
acts first may perceive themselves as the leader of the joint action (Wegner & Sparrow, 2007) 
and therefore may experience a weaker sense of joint agency. One last factor is coordination 
symmetry between co-performers. When coordination is symmetrical (e.g., both people have to 
adapt their own actions to their co-performers’ actions), people may form more accurate 
sensorimotor predictions about their partner’s actions, compared to when coordination is 
asymmetrical (i.e., only one person has to adapt to their partner but not vice versa). In sum, 
Pacherie predicts that, for small-scale joint actions, the sense of joint agency will be strongest in 
situations where individual contributions are of similar importance to the joint goal, where there 
is little distinction between roles, and where both people coordinate with each other rather than 
one person coordinating and the other being coordinated. 
Despite recent theoretical work on joint agency, empirical investigations into the factors 
that influence the sense of joint agency are limited. In the next section, we discuss the handful of 
studies that have examined agency during joint action, all of which have either specifically 
examined self-agency in joint action or were ambiguous as to whether they asked participants to 
rate self- or joint agency.  
Empirical Investigations of Agency in Joint Action 
A handful of studies has examined people’s experiences of agency during cooperative 
joint action. In line with theoretical proposals that the sense of agency involves both a sense of 
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continuous control over an action and a sense of causal responsibility over having produced an 
outcome (Pacherie, 2007), some studies have focused on people’s sense of control over joint 
actions and effects that unfold over time (Dewey et al., 2014; van der Wel, 2015; van der Wel, 
Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2012), whereas other studies have focused on people’s sense of 
responsibility or causation over a joint action outcome (Dewey & Carr, 2013; Obhi & Hall, 
2011). Investigations focused on control over an action have been ambiguous as to whether they 
measured self-agency, joint agency, or a mixture of the two. For example, studies have asked 
participants to rate statements such as “how strongly they had experienced to be in control” (van 
der Wel et al., 2012) or “how effective was your joystick at controlling the dot?” (Dewey et al., 
2014). These statements are ambiguous because they may prompt people to rate their experience 
of control at a group level rather than as an individual (Dewey et al., 2014). Investigations 
focused on the sense of responsibility over an outcome have primarily focused on self-agency. 
For example, Dewey and Carr (2013) asked participants “did you produce the tone?” and had 
them respond on a scale from “definitely not” to “definitely”. Although these previous studies 
have not directly asked people about their sense of joint agency, they provide indirect support for 
some of the theoretical predictions about joint agency described in the previous section.  
First, there is indirect support for the prediction that people will experience joint agency 
when they engage in cooperative joint action. Researchers have found that people’s sense of 
control over a continuous joint action depends on both partners’ combined contributions rather 
than only their own individual contributions. For example, Van der Wel (2015) had pairs of 
participants coordinate their joystick movements to move a single dot from the center of the 
screen to one of two target areas. Ratings of control were equally high for the partner who chose 
which target to move to and for the partner who followed the other’s choice. Similarly, Dewey et 
al. (2014) had pairs of participants use joysticks to keep a cursor centered on a moving target. 
The participants could not see their partner’s joystick and were informed that the movement of 
the cursor could be influenced by their own joystick, their partner’s joystick, random 
perturbations (noise), or any combination of the three. Participants’ ratings of control were higher 
when both participants’ actions contributed to the movement of the cursor (i.e., both joysticks 
were turned on) compared to when only one participant’s actions contributed to its movement 
(i.e., only their own or their partner’s joystick was turned on), as long as participants’ 
contributions were distinguishable (e.g., each was responsible for one movement direction). 
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These findings indicate that people may have evaluated their sense of control at the group level 
rather than at the individual level (“we are in control”; Dewey et al., 2014), since their sense of 
control depended on both partners’ combined contributions. 
Second, there is indirect support for the prediction that joint agency relies on predictions 
about the perceptual effects of a joint action. We would expect that if joint agency relies on 
perceptual predictions, people would feel more joint agency the better they perform, since actions 
are easier to predict the better people perform (van der Wel, 2015). Consistent with this 
prediction, Van der Wel (2015) showed that participants’ ratings of control were positively 
correlated with the smoothness of both their own movements and their partner’s movements. 
Furthermore, Van der Wel et al. (2012) showed that when pairs coordinated their actions to move 
a pole back and forth between two targets, each individual’s ratings of control were positively 
correlated with pair-level task accuracy but not with the amount of force exerted by each 
individual. Both of these studies are consistent with the hypothesis that in joint action, agency 
may be based predominantly on comparisons between expected and actual perceptual 
information, to which both people have access, rather than sensorimotor information, to which 
only individuals have access (see also van der Wel & Knoblich, 2013). 
Lastly, there is indirect support for the prediction that people’s role in a joint action 
influences their sense of agency. Specifically, two studies have examined how people’s role in a 
joint action affects their sense of responsibility for action outcomes. Obhi and Hall (2011) had 
pairs of participants coordinate their actions to depress a single button, which evoked a tone. 
Participants either initiated the button press (leaders) or passively moved their finger along with 
the button after their partner had initiated the press (followers). Participants’ ratings of 
responsibility for producing the tone were polarized such that leaders felt entirely responsible 
whereas followers felt completely not responsible. Dewey and Carr (2013) had pairs of 
participants produce either the first button press (leaders) or the second button press (followers) 
in a two-press sequence. A single tone was evoked at a variable delay after the second button 
press, and participants rated whether they or their partner had produced the tone. In this study, 
followers felt more self-agency (and were rated as having more other-agency) compared to 
leaders, likely because the follower’s button press occurred closest in time to the tone and was 
therefore perceived as having caused it. Together, these studies suggest that people’s roles within 
a joint action affect their experiences of responsibility for joint action outcomes.  
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In sum, empirical investigations of agency during joint action provide some support for 
the theoretical predictions that people may experience a sense of joint agency that is influenced 
by perceptual information and people’s role within the joint action. However, this interpretation 
remains tentative because, to date, no study has asked participants specifically about their 
feelings of joint agency. Thus, the primary goal of the present research was to directly examine 
people’s experiences of joint agency. To do so, we employed a sequence production task 
designed to induce an experience of shared agency, that is, joint agency along with an intact 
sense of self-agency (Pacherie, 2012). In a series of experiments, we manipulated factors 
hypothesized to influence joint agency, and employed rating scales that asked participants 
specifically about their experience of joint agency. Experiment 1 examined Pacherie’s (2012) 
theoretical prediction that people’s experience of shared control over a continuous joint action 
will be stronger when both people are required to coordinate with each other compared to when 
one person coordinates with the other but not vice versa. Experiment 1 also investigated the 
influence of social role on the sense of shared control over a continuous action. Because joint 
agency is thought to include not only a sense of shared control over a continuous action, but also 
a sense of shared responsibility for action outcomes (Pacherie, 2007), Experiment 2 sought to 
establish whether the results from Experiment 1 extended to the sense of shared responsibility for 
a joint outcome. Finally, Experiment 3 followed up an indirect link between action predictability 
and shared control that was identified in Experiment 1. Specifically, Experiment 3 tested whether 
sense of shared control is modulated by the predictability of a partner’s actions. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE INFLUENCE OF COORDINATION AND ROLE ON THE SENSE OF SHARED 
CONTROL 
 
This chapter is based on the journal manuscript: 
Bolt, N. K., Poncelet, E. M., Schultz, B. G., Loehr, J. D. (2016). Mutual coordination strengthens 
the sense of joint agency in cooperative joint action. Manuscript submitted to 
Consciousness and Cognition.  
 
Experiment 1 examined the influence of coordination symmetry and role on people’s 
ratings of shared control. Based on the philosophical and empirical literature reviewed in Chapter 
1, we manipulated two factors that we hypothesized would influence the sense of joint agency. 
First, we manipulated coordination symmetry based on Pacherie’s (2012) prediction that people 
are most likely to experience joint agency when coordination relations between them are 
symmetrical (e.g., when both people in a pair adapt to each other’s actions) compared to when 
they are asymmetrical (e.g., when one person adapts to the other but not vice versa). According to 
Pacherie, symmetry enhances joint agency by increasing the degree to which (and/or the accuracy 
with which) people make predictions about the perceptual consequences of each other’s actions. 
This is consistent with empirical evidence linking perceptual information with the experience of 
agency during joint action (van der Wel, 2015; van der Wel et al., 2012). Second, we manipulated 
participants’ role within the joint action based on Pacherie’s (2012) prediction that people who 
act first (leaders) may experience a weaker sense of joint agency. This is consistent with studies 
showing that people’s roles within a joint action influence their ratings of responsibility for a 
joint action outcome (Dewey & Carr, 2013; Obhi & Hall, 2011).  
Experiment 1 employed a sequence production task in which pairs of participants had to 
coordinate their actions to produce a sequence of tones that matched the pace set by a metronome 
(see Figure 2.1). Each participant produced half of the tones in the sequence, and each tone was 
elicited by a single button press. We manipulated coordination symmetry by having participants 
produce tones either in alternation (ABABABAB, where A and B represent the two partners, 
respectively) or sequentially (AAAABBBB). The alternating task required symmetrical 
coordination between partners, because both partners had to adapt the timing of their own actions 
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to the timing of their partner’s actions on a turn-by-turn basis. In contrast, the sequential task 
required asymmetrical coordination between partners because only the second partner had to 
adapt the timing of their actions to the timing of their partner’s actions. We predicted that 
participants would experience stronger shared control in the alternating compared to the 
sequential task. Role was determined based on which partner acted first for a given sequence: 
leaders produce the first tone(s) in the sequence (i.e., partner A as labeled above) and followers 
produced the subsequent tone(s) (partner B). We hypothesized that the partner who acted first 
might experience weaker shared control than the partner who acted second.  
 
 
Figure 2.1. Schematic illustration of the sequence production task in Experiment 1. Following 
instructions and fixation, participants heard a series of isochronous pacing tones (illustrated by 
eighth note symbols) and then produced a sequence of tones (illustrated by combined button 
press and eighth note symbols, labeled A and B for the two participants, respectively). After 
producing the last tone, each member of the pair provided an agency rating. The pair then 
received feedback indicating whether the sequence they produced matched the pace set by the 
isochronous tones. 
 
The rating scale we used asked participants to “[r]ate your feelings of control over the 
timing of the sequence” on a scale ranging from “shared control” to “independent control”. We 
chose this rating scale for several reasons. First, we focused on people’s sense of control rather 
than causal responsibility because the previous research that most strongly suggests that people 
may experience joint agency was focused on control. Second, we asked participants to rate their 
control over the timing of the sequence because: a) the task required participants to coordinate 
their timing to achieve the shared goal of matching the metronome pace, and b) we wanted 
participants to focus on the timing of the tones rather than the tones themselves, over which we 
expected them to experience strong and constant self-agency. Third, we used the term “shared 
control” as the endpoint reflecting joint agency because this terminology is consistent with 
Instruction Fixation
2000 ms
500 ms
Pacing Tones Sequence Production
Alternating:
Sequential:
Blank
700 ms
Rating Scale
until Enter 1000 ms
Feedback BlankBlank
500 ms
(x 2)
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researchers’ and philosophers’ descriptions of joint agency (e.g., Dewey et al., 2014; Seemann, 
2009), and we used the term “independent control” as the other endpoint to capture the opposite 
of shared control without implicating agency over the tones themselves.  
Method 
Participants 
 Forty-eight University of Saskatchewan students (12 males, mean age = 21.10, SD = 
3.51) participated in the study in pairs. Thirteen of the pairs had two female partners, 10 pairs 
were mixed-gender, and one pair had two male partners. Ethical approval was obtained from the 
institutional review board prior to participant recruitment, and all participants gave informed 
consent before beginning the study. Participants were compensated with either credit for their 
introductory psychology course or $10. 
Design 
 Pairs of participants produced sequences of eight tones that matched the pace set by a 
metronome (i.e., a series of isochronous pacing clicks; see Figure 2.1) in a 2 (task: alternating, 
sequential) by 2 (role: leader, follower) within-subjects design. In the alternating task, 
participants produced tones in alternation with each other (i.e., ABABABAB, where A and B 
refer to each partner, respectively). In the sequential task, one participant produced the first four 
tones and the other produced the last four tones (AAAABBBB). For half of the sequences, the 
participant sitting on the left was the leader (i.e., the participant who produced the first tone(s) in 
the sequence) and for the remaining sequences the participant on the right was the leader.  
Apparatus and Materials  
Participants sat next to each other on the same side of a table. A computer screen was 
centered between them and positioned approximately 60 cm from the edge of the table. An 
Interlink force-sensitive resister (FSR; 3.81 cm2) was placed directly in front of each participant, 
approximately 30 cm from the edge of the table. Participants tapped the FSRs with the index 
finger of their dominant hand. Both participants had visual access to their own and their partner’s 
FSR and finger taps. The FSRs registered participants’ taps without providing any auditory 
feedback. Each tap triggered a 1000 Hz tone (100 ms duration, 10 ms rise/fall time) via a 
WaveShield connected to an Arduino UNO R3 microcontroller. This setup ensured a very short 
latency between taps and tones (approximately 3 ms; see Schultz & van Vugt, 2015, for technical 
details). The Arduinos also sent a signal to the Presentation recording software 
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(Neurobehavioural Systems, Inc., Albany, CA, USA) each time a tap was registered. Presentation 
was used to record the taps and to present the remaining auditory and visual stimuli for the 
experiment, including the four pacing clicks, which were presented in a snare drum timbre. All 
auditory stimuli were presented through speakers placed on both sides of the computer screen. In 
addition, number keypads were placed outside each FSR and covered with occluders so that 
participants could enter their agency ratings but could not see their partner’s ratings. 
Procedure 
The experiment began with two practice blocks, one for the alternating task and one for 
the sequential task. Each practice block began with two pre-training trials during which the 
experimenter controlled the presentation of the events that comprised a trial and explained the 
tasks. The remainder of each practice block consisted of 10 training trials with the timing 
described in the next paragraph. Participants then completed a test phase consisting of 16 blocks 
of 5 trials, also with the timing described in the next paragraph. Participants provided agency 
ratings after every trial in the test blocks only. Blocks alternated between the alternating and 
sequential tasks, the order of which was held constant through both the training and test phases 
and was counterbalanced across participants. One member of the pair was the leader for all trials 
in a given block. We counterbalanced which partner (sitting on the left or right) was the leader on 
the first test block across participants. The partner who was the leader for the first block became 
the follower for the second block. The other partner was then leader and follower for the third 
and fourth blocks, respectively. These four combinations of task and role were repeated four 
times in the same order to make up the 16 test blocks (and the last two of the four combinations 
made up the two training blocks). At the beginning of each block, instructions presented on the 
computer screen indicated which task was to be performed and which participant was to be the 
leader.  
Each trial began with a visual cue to remind participants of the task and roles. The visual 
cue consisted of a cartoon face with two arms, one of which was colored red to indicate that the 
person on that side of the table would produce the first tone(s) in the sequence. The word 
“alternating” or “sequential” appeared above the face. The cue remained on the screen for 2000 
ms. A fixation cross then appeared and remained in the center of the screen until the last tone of 
the sequence was produced. Four pacing clicks were presented at 500 ms intervals beginning 500 
ms after the onset of the fixation cross. Participants were instructed to produce the tone sequence 
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while maintaining the pace set by the clicks. After each sequence, participants were asked to 
“Rate your feelings of control over the timing of the sequence” on a scale that ranged from 01 
(shared control) to 99 (independent control). Participants were instructed to include 0 as the first 
digit for any ratings less than 10 to prevent their partner from guessing their rating based on the 
number of keystrokes they entered. Participants were encouraged to take as much time as they 
needed to complete the ratings. Participants entered their ratings in random order, determined 
separately for each trial and signaled by which side of the screen the rating scale instructions 
appeared on first (e.g., the rating scale first appeared on the right side of the screen, signaling the 
participant on the right to enter their rating, and then switched to the left side of the screen, 
signaling the participant on the left to enter their rating). After both participants had entered their 
ratings, feedback indicating whether or not they had correctly matched the metronome pace was 
presented for 1000 ms in the center of the screen. A green check mark indicated that they had 
correctly matched the pace and a red “X” indicated that they had not.   
Feedback was determined based on whether the average inter-tap interval (ITI) produced 
by participants fell within a window around the required pace of 500 ms. An adaptive window 
size was used to ensure that error rates would be similar (approximately 20%) across conditions, 
preventing a confound between condition and sequence accuracy. The window size was set to 50 
ms at the beginning of the experiment (i.e., sequences were considered correct if the average ITI 
fell within 500 ± 25 ms). After each block, the window size decreased by 10 ms if participants 
made no errors, stayed the same if they made one error (1 error in 5 trials = 20% error rate), or 
increased by 10 ms if they made more than one error. The window size was adjusted separately 
for each combination of task and role, with the exception that the last 5 of the 10 training trials 
for a given task were used in the first window size adjustment for that task (combined with both 
roles). 
Data Analysis 
Performance errors 
We analyzed participants’ agency ratings only for trials on which they received correct 
feedback, to avoid potential effects of attribution biases that may come into play when errors are 
made in a joint task (e.g., Mynatt & Sherman, 1975; Taylor & Doria, 1981). Trials were also 
removed from the analysis if they contained a sequence production error (participants produced 
their tones in the wrong order) or a rating error (participants entered their ratings in the wrong 
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order or a participant entered an invalid rating). In total, 0.67% of correct trials were removed due 
to sequence production errors and an additional 5.21% of correct trials were removed due to 
rating errors. This left an average of 14.58 agency ratings per participant per condition. 
Linear mixed-effects model analysis 
 We used a linear mixed-effects model analysis to examine the effects of task and role on 
agency ratings while accounting for shared variance within pairs. We included fixed factors of 
task (alternating and sequential) and role (leader and follower). We began with a maximal 
random effects structure (Barr, Levy, Sheepers, & Tily, 2013; Bates, Kliegl, Vasishth, & Baayen, 
2015) that included an intercept and slopes for task, role, and their interaction for pairs; an 
intercept and slopes for task, role, and their interaction for participants; and an intercept for trial. 
Model fits were estimated using restricted maximum likelihood via the MIXED command in 
SPSS Version 23. If the model fitting procedure failed to converge, we removed random effects 
whose covariance was estimated as zero. We then iteratively refined the random effects structure 
by checking whether the goodness of fit was significantly reduced after the random effect that 
accounted for the least variance was removed. Specifically, we compared the estimated deviances 
(-2 log-likelihood; -2LL) using a likelihood ratio test (LRT). This procedure allowed us to 
remove random effects not supported by the data (Bates et al., 2015). We then tested whether 
goodness of fit improved by fitting correlation parameters for the remaining variance components 
and for the residuals (Bates et al., 2015). The final model included an intercept and slopes for role 
for pairs; an intercept and slopes for task, role, and the task by role interaction for participants; 
and an intercept for trial. We report F and t tests for fixed effects and post-hoc pairwise 
comparisons, respectively. Degrees of freedom for these tests were obtained by Satterthwaite 
approximation. 
Results 
Figure 2.2 shows the estimated mean agency ratings for each task and role. Participants’ 
mean rating was 39.76 overall (95% CI [33.83, 45.69]), indicating that they tended to experience 
shared rather than independent control when engaged in a cooperative joint action. However, 
participants’ ratings of control differed depending on both task and role. As Figure 2.2 shows, 
participants rated their feelings of control as more shared in the alternating task compared to the 
sequential task, F(1, 46.90) = 13.10, p = .001. Furthermore, participants rated their feelings of 
control as more shared when they were the follower compared to the leader, F(1, 22.64) = 6.10, p 
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= .022. Lastly, there was a significant interaction between task and role, F(1, 39.15) = 7.13, p = 
.010. Table 2.1 shows the estimated mean differences between roles for each task (and between 
tasks for each role), along with confidence intervals and standardized effect sizes. As the table 
shows, the difference in agency ratings between leader and follower was significant in the 
sequential task but not in the alternating task.1 
 
 
Figure 2.2. Estimated mean ratings of control by task and role for Experiment 1. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
 
1The addition of pair gender as a covariate revealed no significant difference in ratings of control 
between pairs that consisted of two female partners and pairs that consisted of a female and male 
partner, F(1, 21.00) = 0.20, p = .66. Furthermore, the effects of task (F(1, 44.94) = 14.53, p < 
.001), role (F(1, 21.67) = 6.53, p = .018), and the task by role interaction (F(1, 36.99) = 6.02, p = 
.019) did not change when pair gender was added to the model. Therefore, pair gender is not 
considered further here.  
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Table 2.1 
Estimated mean differences in ratings of control between roles for each task. 
 
Mean diff. [95% CI],      
Cohen’s d df t p 
Follower vs. Leader a     
     Alternating -2.0 [-5.8, 1.7], 0.13 32.5 1.1 .274 
     Sequential -6.2 [-9.9, -2.5], 0.41 32.3 3.4 .002* 
Alternating vs. Sequential     
    Follower -7.6 [-13.2, -2.0], 0.50 54.5 2.7 .008* 
    Leader -11.8 [-17.3, -6.2], 0.77 54.5 4.2 <.001* 
aMean differences are defined as the second listed condition subtracted from the first listed 
condition (e.g., Follower – Leader). 
*p < .05 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 examined whether coordination symmetry and role within a joint action 
influenced people’s experience of shared control. The experiment yielded three main findings. 
First, people experienced a sense of shared control, rather than independent control, when they 
engaged in a cooperative joint action in which each partner made distinct contributions to a 
shared goal. Previous studies examining agency in joint action have used rating scales that 
focused primarily on self- or other-agency (e.g., Dewey & Carr, 2013; Obhi & Hall, 2011) or 
were ambiguous as to whether they referred to self-agency, joint agency, or a mixture of the two 
(e.g., Dewey et al., 2014; van der Wel et al., 2012). Experiment 1 is the first study, to our 
knowledge, that directly asked people about their sense of joint agency. The finding that people 
experienced a sense of shared control provides empirical support for philosophical accounts that 
posit that people will experience joint agency when they engage in cooperative joint action 
(Dokic, 2010; Pacherie, 2012; Seeman, 2009). This finding also supports Dewey et al.’s (2014) 
inference that people evaluate their sense of control at a group level (i.e., “we did it”) and 
experience joint agency when they continuously coordinate their actions with each other to 
produce a joint action effect.  
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Second, Experiment 1 showed that mutual coordination strengthened people’s sense of 
shared control. People experienced more shared control for a task that required both partners to 
mutually coordinate their actions with each other compared to tasks that required only one 
partner to coordinate their actions with the other. This finding is consistent with Pacherie’s 
(2012) theoretical prediction that people will experience stronger joint agency when coordination 
is symmetrical (when both people adapt to each other’s actions) compared to asymmetrical (when 
only one person adapts to the other). A subsequent study showed that this finding can be 
attributed to differences in objective coordination between tasks (i.e., how well coordinated 
people’s actions were in time; Bolt et al., 2016). People were more objectively coordinated in 
tasks that required mutual coordination compared to tasks that required asymmetrical 
coordination, and the difference in shared control between tasks was reduced to non-significant 
when objective coordination was controlled for statistically. Thus, people felt more shared 
control when coordination was symmetrical because they were more coordinated in time (Bolt et 
al., 2016). 
Third, leaders in the joint action experienced less shared control compared to followers, 
but only when the joint action required asymmetrical coordination. This is consistent with 
Pacherie’s prediction that leaders will feel less joint agency than followers because of the 
salience of their role in the joint action (Pacherie, 2012). However, coordination differences 
between roles may also explain the differences in shared control we observed. Previous research 
suggests that leaders coordinate less with their partners than followers. For example, Konvalinka 
et al. (2014) employed a synchronized finger tapping task in which pairs of participants produced 
simultaneous taps to match a metronome pace. Spontaneous leader and follower relationships 
emerged, whereby one person in the pair took the lead in the sequence (leader) whereas the other 
adapted their own tapping to their partner’s timing (slowing down or speeding up to follow their 
partner’s timing; follower). Leaders displayed increased frontal alpha suppression compared to 
followers, suggesting that leaders spend more resources self-processing rather than adapting to 
their partner’s actions (Konvalinka et al., 2014). Similarly, leaders employ less error correction 
and focus more on their own tapping performance compared to followers (Fairhurst, Janata, & 
Keller, 2014). The possibility that leader-follower differences in shared control depend on the 
degree to which the leader or follower coordinates with their partner is supported by our finding 
that leader-follower differences in ratings of control depended on the coordination requirements 
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within a given task. Leaders felt less shared control than followers when coordination was 
asymmetrical, but there was no difference between leaders and followers when coordination was 
symmetrical. Thus, asymmetrical coordination in which leaders were not required to coordinate 
with followers yielded larger differences in shared control between roles, whereas symmetrical 
coordination that required leaders and followers to mutually coordinate with each other yielded 
no difference in shared control between roles.  
Overall, the finding that coordination between partners increased the amount of shared 
control people felt is consistent with Pacherie’s (2012) proposal that joint agency relies on 
congruence between predicted and actual perceptual consequences of an action. Specifically, 
better coordination may enhance joint agency by increasing the degree to which people can 
accurately predict each other’s actions. We will return to this relationship in Experiment 3. 
Before doing so, we next test whether the same factors that affect people’s sense of control over a 
joint action also affect their sense of causal responsibility over a joint outcome. 
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CHAPTER 3 
OUTCOME VALENCE INFLUENCES JOINT RESPONSIBILITY 
Experiment 1 established that mutual coordination and role influence people’s sense of 
control over a continuous joint action. However, the sense of joint agency is thought to include 
not only a sense of control over a continuous action, but also a sense of responsibility over 
having produced an outcome (Pacherie, 2007). Thus, Experiment 2 examined whether mutual 
coordination and role would likewise influence people’s sense of responsibility for a joint action 
outcome (i.e., whether or not they successfully achieved a joint goal). We predicted that, as in 
Experiment 1, people would feel more shared responsibility over an outcome produced by mutual 
coordination, and followers in the joint action would feel more shared responsibility over an 
outcome than leaders.  
Experiment 2 also examined whether the valence of the outcome (i.e., whether the 
outcome was correct or incorrect) influenced people’s sense of shared responsibility. Outcome 
valence has been shown to influence people’s sense of self-agency (Gentsch & Synofzik, 2014; 
Takahata et al., 2012). For example, people display a self-serving attribution bias, whereby they 
are more likely to take responsibility for successful outcomes compared to unsuccessful 
outcomes (Mezulis et al., 2004; Miller & Ross, 1975). During joint action, people display a 
group-serving bias and attribute successful outcomes to the group rather than individuals (Taylor 
& Doria, 1981; Zaccaro, Peterson, & Walker, 1987). Furthermore, people may attribute 
unsuccessful joint outcomes to individuals (including themselves), which seems contradictory to 
accounts of a self-serving bias. However, when joint success is the goal, a group-serving bias 
seems to be dominant over a self-serving bias and attributing more responsibility for failure to 
oneself, and less to other members of the group, may help maintain group cohesion (Taylor, 
Doria, & Tyler, 1983). Based on these studies, we predicted that the valence of the joint outcome 
would influence people’s sense of joint agency. Specifically, we predicted that people would feel 
a sense of shared responsibility over successful outcomes, and blame unsuccessful outcomes on 
individuals (either themselves or their partner). 
Experiment 2 employed the same method as Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. 
First, we revised the rating scale to ask participants to “[r]ate your feeling of responsibility over 
the outcome” on a scale ranging from “I was responsible for the outcome” to “my partner was 
responsible for the outcome,” with the midpoint indicating “we were both responsible for the 
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outcome”. This scale was based on Obhi and Hall’s (2011) study, in which participants rated 
their sense of responsibility over producing a single tone on a scale from “completely not 
responsible” to “entirely responsible”, with the midpoint indicating “we pressed the button at the 
same time”. The key difference between our scale and the scale used by Obhi and Hall was the 
that the midpoint on our scale specifically asked about shared responsibility, rather than just 
asking about unified temporal performance. Second, we provided feedback about the success of 
the joint outcome after each sequence, prior to agency ratings, to examine how outcome valence 
influenced people’s sense of responsibility. 
Method 
The methods were the same as for Experiment 1, with the following exceptions. 
Participants  
Thirty University of Saskatchewan students (8 males, mean age = 22.7, SD = 6.1) 
participated in the study in pairs. Eight of the pairs had two female partners, 6 pairs were mixed-
gender, and one pair had two male partners.   
Design 
Pairs of participants performed the same sequence production task as in Experiment 1 in a 
2 (task: alternating, sequential) by 2 (role: leader, follower) within-subjects design (see Figure 
3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1. Schematic illustration of the sequence production task in Experiment 2. Following 
instructions and fixation, participants heard a series of isochronous pacing tones (illustrated by 
eighth note symbols) and then produced a sequence of tones (illustrated by combined button 
press and eighth note symbols, labeled A and B for the two participants, respectively). After 
producing the last tone, the pair received feedback indicating whether the sequence they 
produced matched the pace set by the isochronous tones. Each member of the pair then provided 
an agency rating. 
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Procedure 
We used the same procedure as in Experiment 1 with two exceptions. First, feedback was 
presented on the screen after each sequence (and before participants provided their agency 
ratings). Participants either received a green checkmark (correct) or a red x (incorrect) depending 
on an adaptive window (see Procedure section of Experiment 1). Second, we used a rating scale 
that ranged from 01 (“I was responsible for the outcome”) to 50 (“we were both responsible for 
the outcome”) to 99 (“my partner was responsible for the outcome”).  
Data Analysis 
Performance errors 
Trials were removed from the analysis if they contained a sequence production error 
(tones were produced in the wrong order) or a rating error (participants entered their ratings in the 
wrong order or a participant entered an invalid rating). In total, 1.42% of trials were removed due 
to sequence production errors and an additional 6.59% of trials were removed due to rating 
errors. This left an average of 18.42 agency ratings per participant per condition.  
Linear mixed-effects model analysis 
Similar to Experiment 1, we used a linear mixed model analysis to examine the effects of 
task, role, and outcome on agency ratings while accounting for shared variance within pairs. We 
included fixed factors of task (alternating and sequential), role (leader and follower), and 
outcome (correct and incorrect). We began with a maximal random effects structure that included 
an intercept and slopes for task, role, outcome, and all possible interactions for pairs; an intercept 
and slopes for task, role, outcome, and all possible interactions for participants; and an intercept 
for trial. We refined the random effects structure using the same strategy as Experiment 1. The 
reduced random effects model (Model 3.1) included no random effects and heterogeneous 
residual covariances. 
Results 
Figure 3.2 shows the estimated mean agency ratings by task and role for correct and 
incorrect outcomes, respectively, as estimated in Model 3.1. As the figure shows, agency ratings 
were similar across tasks and roles. Accordingly, Model 3.1 showed no significant effects of role 
or task and no two-way or three-way interactions, all Fs < .70, all ps > .40. We therefore reduced 
the fixed effects in the model by iteratively removing each non-significant fixed effect (as 
estimated with full maximum likelihood) and comparing goodness of fit estimates (-2LL). Table 
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3.1 shows the model comparisons. As shown in the table, model fit did not significantly decrease 
after removing any of the non-significant fixed effects. Therefore, the final model (Model 3.7) 
included only the significant fixed effect of outcome, F(1, 368.59) = 20.82, p < .001. The 
estimated mean rating for correct outcomes was 49.58 (indicating shared responsibility), whereas 
the estimated mean rating for incorrect outcomes was 42.47 (indicating more self-responsibility), 
d = 0.48, 95% CI [4.05, 10.19].   
 
 
Figure 3.2. Estimated mean ratings of responsibility by task and role for Experiment 2 when the 
outcome was correct (A) and incorrect (B). Error bars represent the standard error of the mean. 
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Table 3.1  
Model comparisons for the effect of task, role, and feedback on agency ratings.   
Model Comparison Change in df Deviance (-2LL) χ2 p 
Model 3.1  17195.63   
Model 3.2 [vs. 3.1] 1 17195.93 0.30 .58 
Model 3.3 [vs. 3.2] 1 17195.99 0.06 .81 
Model 3.4 [vs. 3.3] 1 17196.15 0.16 .69 
Model 3.5 [vs. 3.4] 1 17197.30 1.15 .28 
Model 3.6 [vs. 3.5] 1 17197.30 0.0 1.0 
Model 3.7 [vs. 3.6] 1 17197.88 0.58 .45 
Note. 
T = Task; R = Role; O = Outcome 
Model 3.1 = T + R + O + T*R + T*O + R*O + T*R*O 
Model 3.2 = T + R + O + T*R + T*O + R*O  
Model 3.3 = T + R + O + T*R + R*O  
Model 3.4 = T + R + O + T*R  
Model 3.5 = T + R + O  
Model 3.6 = T + O 
Model 3.7 = O 
 
To examine whether participants’ ratings were polarized to specific points in the rating 
scale (cf. Obhi & Hall, 2011), we plotted the frequency of agency ratings at each point along the 
scale. Figure 3.3 shows the frequency of agency ratings collapsed across task and role for correct 
and incorrect outcomes. As this figure shows, agency ratings for correct outcomes were almost 
always exactly 50. In contrast, agency ratings for incorrect outcomes were more varied across the 
rating scale, with peaks at self-responsibility (1) and shared responsibility (50). This is consistent 
with the results from the mixed model analysis, which showed lower ratings (closer to 1) on 
average for incorrect outcomes compared to correct outcomes.  
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Figure 3.3. The number of trials on which participants selected each point on the rating scale for 
correct outcomes (A) and incorrect outcomes (B).  
 
Figures 3.4 and 3.5 show the frequency of agency ratings by task and role for correct and 
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trials were more varied across combinations of task and role, although the general pattern of 
peaks at both self- and shared responsibility was consistent across conditions.  
 
 
 
Figure 3.4. The number of trials on which participants selected each point on the rating scale for 
correct outcomes in each condition: A) alternating leader, B) alternating follower, C) sequential 
leader, and D) sequential follower. 
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Figure 3.5. The number of trials on which participants selected each point on the rating scale for 
incorrect outcomes in each condition: A) alternating leader, B) alternating follower, C) sequential 
leader, and D) sequential follower. 
  
Discussion 
Experiment 2 examined whether coordination symmetry, role within a joint action, and 
outcome valence influenced people’s experience of shared responsibility for a joint action 
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research showing a group-serving bias, whereby people attribute successful outcomes to the 
group (Taylor & Doria, 1983). The finding that people also ascribed more self-blame for 
incorrect compared to correct outcomes is consistent with promoting group cohesion (Taylor & 
Doria, 1983). People may accept blame for failure to when group success is more important than 
individual success.  
 Unlike Experiment 1, Experiment 2 showed that ratings of responsibility did not differ 
depending on whether people mutually coordinated actions or their role in the joint action. This 
finding suggests that people’s sense of responsibility for a joint outcome may rely on different 
cues than their sense of control over a continuous joint action. More specifically, this finding 
suggests that cues to joint agency may be weighted differently depending on which aspect of 
joint agency people are asked about. In Experiment 2, people may have based their ratings of 
responsibility on outcome valence because outcome valence was more salient than the factors 
that influenced action coordination (i.e., coordination symmetry and role). There are two reasons 
that outcome valence was more salient in Experiment 2 than Experiment 1. First, we specifically 
asked people about their sense of responsibility over the outcome, rather than their sense of 
control over the sequence, thus increasing their attention towards the outcome. Second, we 
presented the outcome (correct or incorrect feedback) before people rated their sense of 
responsibility, compared to Experiment 1 in which we presented the outcome after people had 
made their ratings. The finding that cues to joint agency were weighted by salience is consistent 
with the multifactorial weighting account of self-agency, whereby cues are weighted by their 
availability, reliability, and/or salience in a given situation (Synofzik et al., 2013).  
 Obhi and Hall (2011) showed that people’s ratings of responsibility over joint outcomes 
were polarized such that people either attributed responsibility to themselves (self-responsibility) 
or their partner (other-responsibility) depending on their role in the joint action. This differs from 
our finding that people almost always felt shared responsibility for correct outcomes and were 
more varied in the responsibility they felt for incorrect outcomes. There are three important 
distinctions between our study and Obhi and Hall’s study that may explain the differences in 
findings. First, in Experiment 2, each person produced an equal number of distinct tones to meet 
a shared goal, whereas in Obhi and Hall’s study, two people contributed unequally to produce a 
single tone. Equal contributions between co-performers are thought to increase the amount of 
shared responsibility people experience (Pacherie, 2012), leading to more ratings of shared 
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responsibility in Experiment 2 compared to Obhi and Hall. Second, Experiment 2 provided a 
rating scale that specifically asked about people’s sense of shared responsibility, whereas Obhi 
and Hall included “we pressed the button at the same time” as the midpoint on their scale. The 
latter focuses on the united temporality of people’s actions and does not necessarily imply shared 
responsibility. Thus, Obhi and Hall’s participants could have felt a sense of shared responsibility 
and yet still provided ratings that polarized toward self or other based on pressing the button at 
slightly different times. Finally, Experiment 2 provided feedback (correct or incorrect) as the 
joint outcome, whereas Obhi and Hall provided a tone, which gave no indication of success or 
failure per se. Therefore, Experiment 2 provided an additional cue to responsibility (outcome 
valence) that was not present in Obhi and Hall’s study.  
 In the next chapter we return to the sense of control over a continuous action. Experiment 
1 showed that factors that increase coordination strengthened the sense of shared control over a 
continuous action. Coordination is thought to influence the sense of shared control by influencing 
people’s ability to predict each other’s actions (Pacherie, 2012). In Experiment 3, we directly 
examined the link between the predictability of a partner’s actions and people’s experience of 
shared control.   
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CHAPTER 4 
THE PREDICTABILITY OF A PARTNER’S ACTIONS MODULATES THE SENSE OF 
SHARED CONTROL 
 
This chapter is based on the journal manuscript:  
Bolt, N. K., & Loehr, J. D. (2016). The predictability of a partner’s actions modulates the sense 
of joint agency. Manuscript submitted to Cognition. 
 
Experiment 3 examined whether the predictability of a partner’s actions influences the 
sense of shared control over an action. Like self-agency, the sense of joint agency might rely on 
predictions about actions and their effects, including predictions about the timing of the action 
and/or its consequences. However, during cooperative joint action, people make predictions not 
only about their own actions, but also about their partner’s actions and the joint action (Keller et 
al., in press). Pacherie (2012) proposes that people might use these predictions to inform their 
sense of joint agency. More specifically, Pacherie hypothesizes that the more accurately people 
can predict each other’s actions, and consequently the joint action, the more joint agency they 
will feel. For example, when people are better at performing a joint action, they are likely more 
accurate at making predictions, thus strengthening their sense of joint agency.  
Indirect support for Pacherie’s (2012) hypothesis comes from empirical findings that 
people’s ratings of control over a joint action are positively correlated with the smoothness of 
both their own and their partner’s movements (van der Wel, 2015) and with pair-level task 
accuracy (Dewey et al., 2014; van der Wel, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2012). These findings suggest 
that people take into account both their own and their partner’s action timing during joint action 
and base their sense of control on how accurately they can predict their own and their partner’s 
actions. However, the rating scales used in these studies were ambiguous as to whether they 
referred to self-agency, joint agency, or both (Dewey et al., 2014). For example, Dewey et al.’s 
(2014) scale asked participants to rate “how effective was your joystick at controlling the dot?”. 
Participants felt more control when their partner contributed to the task, suggesting that people 
may have interpreted the scale as indicating shared control over the dot rather than self control. 
Indirect support for Pacherie’s hypothesis also comes from Experiment 1, which showed that 
factors that increase coordination between partners increase the strength of shared control (Bolt et 
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al., 2016). Better coordination may enhance joint agency by increasing the accuracy to which 
people can predict their partner’s actions (Pacherie, 2012; Keller, Knoblich, & Repp, 2007; Loehr 
& Palmer, 2011). Here, we directly test the link between the predictability of a partner’s actions 
and shared control.  
Experiment 3 employed the alternating (symmetrical) sequence production task used in 
the previous two experiments. Participants coordinated their actions with two confederate 
partners, the timing of whose actions was manipulated so that one partner’s actions were highly 
predictable in time and the other partner’s actions were less predictable. Participants rated their 
sense of control on the same scale as Experiment 1, which asked participants to “[r]ate your 
feelings of control over the timing of the sequence” on a scale ranging from “shared control” to 
“independent control”. We hypothesized that people would experience stronger joint agency 
when they coordinated with the more predictable partner.   
Method 
The methods were the same as for Experiment 1 with the following exceptions. 
Participants 
Forty-eight University of Saskatchewan Students (17 male, mean age = 19.69, SD = 2.18) 
participated in the study. Ethical approval was obtained from the institutional review board. 
Participants gave informed consent and were compensated with course credit.  
Design 
Participants coordinated their actions with confederate partners to produce 8-tone 
sequences that matched the pace set by a metronome (Figure 4.1). Partner predictability was 
manipulated within-subjects; each participant was paired with a high-predictability partner, 
whose ITIs were selected from a uniform distribution that ranged from 490-510 ms (i.e., the 500 
ms metronome pace ± 10 ms) in 1ms increments, and a low-predictability partner, whose ITIs 
were selected from a uniform distribution from 440-560 ms (500 ± 60 ms).  
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Figure 4.1. Schematic illustration of the sequence production task in Experiment 3. Following 
instructions and fixation, participants heard a series of isochronous pacing tones (illustrated by 
eighth note symbols) and then produced a sequence of tones (illustrated by combined button 
press and eighth note symbols, labeled A and B for the two participants, respectively). After 
producing the last tone, each partner then provided an agency rating. 
 
Apparatus and Materials 
The Arduinos signaled PsychoPy software (Peirce, 2007) when a tap was registered. 
PsychoPy recorded the taps and presented the remaining stimuli, including the metronome (880 
Hz) and confederate (1000 Hz) tones. A 40cm occluder was centered between the FSRs to 
prevent partners from seeing each other’s taps and agency ratings.  
Procedure 
The confederates and participant arrived at the experiment at approximately the same 
time. They were instructed that they would coordinate with each other in different pairings and 
then drew numbers to decide who would sit on the right vs. left. In reality, the participant always 
drew 1 and was seated on the right, one confederate indicated that they had drawn 2 and was 
seated on the left, and the other confederate was instructed to leave the room. The two 
confederates switched places halfway through the experiment. We counterbalanced across 
participants whether they coordinated with the high- or low-predictability partner first and the 
assignment of confederates to predictability.  
Each half of the experiment began with two trials during which the experimenter 
explained the task. Partners then performed 5 training trials and 6 blocks of 5 test trials. Both 
partners provided agency ratings after every test trial. One partner was the leader (produced the 
first sequence tone) for all trials in a given block. Partners alternated between leader and follower 
across blocks (including training). We counterbalanced whether the participant was the leader on 
the first block across participants. At the beginning of each block, instructions presented onscreen 
indicated which partner was the leader.  
Instruction Fixation
2000 ms
500 ms
Pacing Tones Sequence Production Blank
700 ms
Rating Scale
until Enter
Blank
(x 2)
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Partners were instructed to alternate their actions to produce an 8-tone sequence while 
maintaining the metronome pace. Confederates produced tapping movements that did not contact 
the FSR directly. After each sequence, both partners rated their “feelings of control over the 
timing of the sequence” on a scale from 01 (“shared control”) to 99 (“independent control”).  
After the participant had coordinated with the second confederate, both were told that the 
coordination phase was complete. They were given the demographics questionnaire and the 
experimenter left the room ostensibly to give the other participant their questionnaire. Next, the 
experimenter announced that there were verbal questions to be answered individually, and the 
confederate was instructed to leave the room first. Participants then completed a debriefing that 
probed what they thought the purpose of the experiment was, general suspicions, and whether 
they noticed differences between their partners (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). One participant 
guessed the confederate manipulation and was replaced. Most participants (39/48) reported 
noticing a difference between their partners (e.g., one was better at the task).  
Data Analysis  
Performance errors 
Similar to the previous experiments, trials with rating errors (partners entered their ratings 
in the wrong order or an invalid rating; 2.2%) were excluded from analysis. Trials with sequence 
errors were also excluded from analysis. Because the computer produced a confederate tone after 
each of the participant’s taps and/or the last pacing tone, the correct sequence was always 
produced. Sequence errors were therefore identified by unusually short or long ITIs (3 SD above 
or below the mean ITI across all trials for a given participant; 10.56%), which occurred, for 
example, if a participant attempted to produce the first sequence tone when the confederate was 
the leader or paused due to confusion about whose turn it was. Visual inspection of the data also 
identified 16 trials (0.55%) that contained intervals > 2000 ms, which were excluded before 
calculating the mean ITIs. Excluding these trials also ensured that we examined people’s 
experience of joint agency independent of attributions of blame for large timing errors. 
Linear mixed-effects model analysis 
Similar to the previous two experiments, data were analyzed using linear mixed-effects 
models. We first examined the effect of partner predictability on agency. We began with a 
maximal random effects structure that included a fixed effect of predictability and a random 
intercept and slope for predictability. We refined the random effects using the same strategy as 
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the previous two experiments. The final model (Model 4.1) included an intercept and slope for 
predictability and heterogeneous residual covariances.  
Second, we examined the effect of predictability after controlling for the accuracy of the 
joint performance (joint accuracy, defined as the absolute value of the difference between the 
mean ITI of a given sequence and the required 500 ms ITI), the timing of the participant’s actions 
(participant timing, defined as the SD of the participant’s ITIs [from the preceding tone to the 
participant’s tap]), and the timing of the confederate’s tones (confederate timing, defined as the 
SD of the confederate’s ITIs [from the preceding tone to the confederate’s tone]). Because we 
expected the effect of predictability to be driven by our manipulation of confederate timing, we 
expected that a) it would remain significant after controlling for differences in joint accuracy 
and/or participant timing that may have been induced by the manipulation and b) it would be 
reduced after controlling for confederate timing. We used a step-up strategy (West, Welch, & 
Galecki, 2015), in which fixed factors were added to the model one at a time and were retained if 
they significantly increased model fit or removed if they did not. We added the following fixed 
factors in the following order (Models 4.2-4.7): joint accuracy, joint accuracy by predictability, 
participant timing, participant timing by predictability, confederate timing, and confederate 
timing by predictability. To compare models with different fixed effects, we estimated model fit 
using full maximum likelihood and compared -2LLs using LRT. We re-estimated the effect of 
predictability after each covariate that significantly improved model fit, using restricted 
maximum likelihood. We report F-tests for fixed effects (degrees of freedom obtained by 
Satterthwaite approximation), as well as Cohen’s d and standardized coefficients () as measures 
of effect size for categorical and continuous fixed effects, respectively. 
Results 
 Figure 4.2 shows participants’ mean agency ratings by predictability as estimated in 
Model 4.1. As the figure shows, participants rated their feelings of control as more shared when 
they coordinated with the high-predictability compared to low-predictability partner. Table 1 (left 
half) shows the deviance for Model 4.1 and subsequent models. Table 4.1 (right half) shows the 
effect of predictability (the difference in agency ratings between high- and low-predictability 
partners), along with its 95% CI, effect size, and F-test. 
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Figure 4.2. Estimated mean agency ratings by partner predictability for Experiment 3. Error bars 
represent the standard error of the mean.  
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Table 4.1 
Model comparisons for the effect of joint accuracy, participant timing, and confederate timing on 
agency ratings.   
 Model comparisons Effect of partner predictability 
 
Δ df -2LL 2 p 
Mean diffa 
[95% CI] 
d 
F 
(df) 
p 
Model 4.1  21337.43   
-7.52 
[-12.55, -2.50] 
.46 
9.07 
(1, 46.45) 
.004* 
Model 4.2 
[vs. 4.1] 
1 21304.21 33.22 <.001* 
-6.93 
[-11.90, -1.96] 
.42 
7.88 
(1, 46.59) 
.007* 
Model 4.3 
[vs.4.2] 
1 21304.08 0.13 .72     
Model 4.4 
[vs. 4.2] 
1 21221.26 82.95 <.001* 
-6.43 
[-11.33, -1.54] 
.40 
6.99 
(1, 46.62) 
.01* 
Model 4.5 
[vs.4.4] 
1 21220.14 1.12 .29     
Model 4.6 
[vs. 4.4] 
1 21215.01 6.25 .01* 
-3.44 
[-8.83, 1.96] 
.21 
1.61 
(1, 71.89) 
.21 
Model 4.7 
[vs. 4.6] 
1 21214.68 0.33 .57 
    
aMean difference = high-predictability partner minus low-predictability partner.  
Note.  
P = predictability; JA = joint accuracy; PT = participant timing; CT = confederate timing. 
Model 4.1 = P  
Model 4.2 = P+JA 
Model 4.3 = P + JA + P*JA  
Model 4.4 = P + JA + PT 
Model 4.5 = P + JA + PT + P*PT 
Model 4.6 = P + JA + PT + CT 
Model 4.7 = P + JA + PT + CT + P*CT 
*p < .05 
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Table 4.1 (left) shows that adding joint accuracy, participant timing, and confederate 
timing significantly improved model fit, whereas adding interactions between these variables and 
predictability did not. Table 4.1 (right) shows that the effect of predictability was approximately 
the same size (and significant) after joint accuracy and participant timing were included in the 
model (Models 4.2 and 4.4), but was smaller in size (and non-significant) when confederate 
timing was included in the model (Model 4.6).2 
Figure 4.3 shows the effects of joint accuracy, participant timing, and confederate timing 
on agency ratings as estimated in Model 4.6. Participants rated their feelings of control as more 
shared when the joint performance was more accurate (i.e., closer to the metronome pace; Figure 
4.3A), b = .25, F(1, 2457.44) = 41.75, p < .001,  = .11. Participants also rated their feelings of 
control as more shared when the timing of their own actions was less variable on a given 
sequence (Figure 4.3B), b = .17, F(1, 2357.55) = 82.11, p < .001,  = .14. Finally, participants 
rated their feelings of control as more shared when the timing of their partners’ tones was less 
variable (Figure 4.3C), b = .11, F(1, 1304.59) = 6.26, p = .012,   = .08. 
 
 
Figure 4.3. Estimated mean agency ratings plotted at mean ±1 SD values of A) joint accuracy, B) 
participant timing, and C) confederate timing. Error bars represent the standard error of the mean.  
 
                                                 
 
 
2The effect of predictability was also reduced and non-significant when only confederate timing 
was added to Model 4.1 (mean difference = -4.26, 95% CI [-9.78, 1.27], d = 0.18, F(1, 71.08) = 
2.36, p = .13).   
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Discussion 
 Experiment 3 examined whether the predictability of a partner’s actions influences 
people’s experience of shared control during joint action. People reported stronger feelings of 
shared (as opposed to independent) control over the timing of the sequence when they 
coordinated with the more predictable partner. This difference remained after statistically 
controlling for effects of a) overall accuracy of the partners’ performance, and b) variability of 
the participant’s action timing, on joint agency. However, the difference was no longer 
significant after controlling for variability of the partner’s action timing. These findings confirm 
that partner predictability affected shared control independently of its effects on a person’s own 
action timing and the quality of the joint performance.  
The finding that people felt increased shared control when their partner’s actions were 
more predictable indicates that people’s sense of shared control relies on their ability to 
accurately predict their partner’s actions. This parallels research showing that the sense of self-
agency relies on people’s ability to accurately predict their own actions (Frith et al., 2000). 
Moreover, this finding provides empirical support for Pacherie’s hypothesis (2012) that people’s 
sense of shared control over a joint action is driven in part by perceptual predictions about co-
performers’ actions. Thus, during joint action, people also have to take their partners actions into 
account when determining their sense of joint agency.  
Experiment 3 revealed two additional factors that influenced shared control beyond 
partner predictability. First, more accurate joint performance was associated with stronger 
feelings of shared control. Although accuracy was implicit in this experiment (i.e., sensed based 
on the timing of the sequence), rather than explicitly provided through feedback, this finding 
parallels our results from Experiment 2 whereby people felt more shared responsibility for correct 
compared to incorrect outcomes. Furthermore, the finding that more accurate joint performance 
elicited stronger shared control is consistent with previous work showing that pair-level task 
accuracy is associated with increased feelings of control over a joint action (Dewey et al., 2014; 
van der Wel et al., 2012). Here, we show that joint accuracy specifically strengthens joint agency. 
Second, reduced variability of a person’s own action timing was associated with stronger shared 
control, indicating that people rely on information about their own actions in addition to their 
partner’s to determine their sense of joint agency. These findings support Pacherie’s (2012) 
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hypothesis that joint agency depends on the accuracy of joint- and self-predictions, respectively, 
in addition to other-predictions.   
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CHAPTER 5 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
Portions of this chapter are based on the following journal manuscripts: 
Bolt, N. K., Poncelet, E. M., Schultz, B. G., Loehr, J. D. (2016). Mutual coordination strengthens 
the sense of joint agency in cooperative joint action. Manuscript submitted to 
Consciousness and Cognition.  
 
Bolt, N. K., & Loehr, J. D. (2016). The predictability of a partner’s actions modulates the sense 
of joint agency. Manuscript submitted to Cognition. 
 
Summary of Major Findings 
Together, the three experiments presented in this thesis provide direct empirical evidence 
that people experience a sense of joint agency during joint action. This supports philosophical 
accounts that predict people will experience joint agency during joint action (Dokic, 2010; 
Pacherie, 2012; Seeman, 2009), as well as empirical speculation that people evaluate their sense 
of control at a group level when they engage in joint action (Dewey et al., 2014; van der Wel et 
al., 2012). Given that the sense of agency consists of both a sense of control over a continuous 
action as well as a sense of causal responsibility over having produced an outcome (Pacherie, 
2007), we also show that people experience both a sense of shared control over a continuous joint 
action (Experiments 1 and 3) and a sense of shared responsibility over a joint action outcome 
(Experiment 2).  
Furthermore, Experiments 1 and 3 provide evidence that the sense of shared control over 
an action is in part driven by how well people can predict each other’s actions (Pacherie, 2012). 
Experiment 1 provides indirect support for this hypothesis by showing that factors that increase 
coordination between partners strengthen the sense of shared control. Coordination is thought to 
enhance joint agency by increasing the degree to which people can make accurate predictions 
about each other’s actions (Pacherie, 2012). In line with this idea, previous research has shown 
that the better people are able to predict each other’s actions, the more coordinated their actions 
are in time (Keller et al., 2007; Loehr & Palmer, 2011; Zamm et al., 2016). Experiment 1 and 
subsequent research (Bolt et al., 2016) expand on this to show that the more coordinated people’s 
actions are in time, the stronger their sense of joint agency. Experiment 3 directly tested the link 
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between predictions and shared control by manipulating whether a partner’s actions were more or 
less predictable. We found that people felt more shared control when their partner’s actions were 
more predictable. Thus, our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that congruence between 
predicted and post-hoc information about another person’s actions is used to derive a sense of 
shared control, much like congruence between predicted and post-hoc information about one’s 
own actions is used to derive a sense of self-agency (Pacherie, 2008). Experiment 3 also showed 
that the timing of one’s own actions and the joint action are also taken into account when 
determining the sense of shared control: People felt more shared control when the joint outcome 
was more accurate, and when there was less variability in their own action timing. 
Experiment 2 provides evidence that the cues used to determine joint agency receive 
different weight depending on their salience in the situation. In Experiment 2, people relied on 
outcome valence, rather than perceptual predictions about a partner’s actions, to derive their 
sense of responsibility over the joint action outcome. Here, cognitive information (i.e., outcome 
valence) was more salient than it was Experiments 1 and 3 because we specifically asked people 
about the outcome and presented the outcome before people made their ratings. These findings 
are consistent with a multifactorial weighting account of self-agency, whereby cues used to 
inform the sense of self-agency are given more weight depending on their salience in the situation 
(Synofzik et al., 2013).  
The three experiments presented here are the first to empirically investigate the sense of 
joint agency and provide insight into the factors that influence people’s experience of joint 
agency. In the next section, we discuss the implications of these results for theories of joint 
agency and joint action. 
Implications for Theories of Joint Agency 
The findings from the three experiments presented here provide the first direct test of 
Pacherie’s (2012) integrative framework of joint agency. Pacherie states that, like the sense of 
self-agency, joint agency relies on congruence between predicted and actual action effects. In 
joint agency, however, people not only have to take into account their own actions, but also their 
partners’ actions and the joint action (Pacherie, 2012). Overall, then, Pacherie theorizes that the 
sense of joint agency relies on congruence between joint-predictions and effects, which in turn 
relies on the accuracy of self- and other-predictions at each level of action specification: 
cognitive, perceptual, and sensorimotor. The experiments presented here provide evidence that 
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the sense of shared control relies on the predictions people make about self-, other-, and joint-
action consequences at a perceptual level. Specifically, Experiment 1 provides preliminary 
evidence that joint agency depends on perceptual predictions during joint action because factors 
that increase coordination, and thus increase the degree to which people can accurately predict 
each other’s actions (Pacherie, 2012; Keller et al., 2007; Loehr & Palmer, 2011), were shown to 
increase people’s sense of shared control. Experiment 3 directly establishes that joint agency 
depends on perceptual predictions about the timing of a person’s own actions, their partner’s 
actions, and the joint action. These findings expand on previous research that provided indirect 
support for Pacherie’s hypothesis that people’s experience of agency during joint action relies on 
perceptual predictions (van der Wel, 2015; van der Wel et al., 2012).  
Our findings also provide a potential avenue to extend Pacherie’s (2012) framework. The 
findings from Experiment 2 suggest that people base their sense of joint agency on the cue that is 
most salient in the situation, rather than weighting all cues equally. Although perceptual 
information about each partner’s actions was available to the same extent in Experiment 2 as it 
was in Experiments 1 and 3, people predominantly based their sense of agency on more salient 
cognitive information about the outcome and less on perceptual information in Experiment 2. 
Pacherie’s framework does not currently provide an explanation for the difference in findings 
between Experiment 2 and Experiments 1 and 3. Pacherie indicates that cues can come from 
different levels of action specification (cognitive, perceptual, or sensorimotor), but does not make 
predictions about how cues at each level will be weighted. Theories of self-agency, such as 
optimal cue integration theory, have proposed that cues receive different weights depending on 
their reliability, availability, and salience (Synokzik et al., 2009). Thus, Pacherie’s framework 
could be expanded to include predictions for how cues at different levels of action specification 
are integrated to inform the sense of joint agency. The findings from our three experiments 
suggest that, as with self-agency, cues that are more salient will receive more weight in 
determining the sense of joint agency. Weighting cues based on their salience might be 
advantageous because it requires less computation, especially for joint agency where predictions 
and comparisons are made for multiple actions (self, other, and joint actions) at multiple levels of 
action specification (cognitive, perceptual, and sensorimotor). If a cue is deemed less important, 
based on its low salience or reliability in the situation, then people may not rely as much on this 
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cue to determine their sense of joint agency.3 In addition to extending Pacherie’s framework of 
joint agency to include cue weighting and integration at different levels of action specification, 
theoretical predictions about the sense of joint agency could also address whether self-, other-, 
and joint-predictions are weighted differently depending on the joint action context and by what 
mechanisms they are integrated into a coherent experience of joint agency.  
Implications for Joint Action 
The findings presented here also have implications for theories of joint action, specifically 
with respect to the internal models involved in joint action. Keller et al. (in press) propose that 
internal models for self- and other-produced actions run in parallel. Predictions and perceptual 
effects from individual models are then combined to form a joint internal model (Keller et al., in 
press). Experiment 1 showed that people felt more joint agency when there was mutual 
coordination between partners, suggesting that people may predict each other’s actions to a 
greater degree and/or more accurately when they have to mutually coordinate (Pacherie, 2012). 
Thus, tasks demands (i.e., whether people have to mutually coordinate or not) may influence the 
degree and/or accuracy with which people predict their partner’s actions and integrate their own 
and their partner’s action timing. In addition, Experiment 3 provides evidence that people not 
only make perceptual predictions about others’ actions and incorporate them into their own action 
planning during joint action (Knoblich & Jordan, 2003; Kourtis et al., 2013; Loehr et al., 2013; 
Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2013); they also rely on those predictions to inform 
their sense of joint agency. Together, these findings are consistent with Keller et al.’s theory that 
people integrate individual actions into a joint internal model. Furthermore, these findings 
suggest that internal models in joint action serve as more than just a mechanism for error 
correction (van der Steen & Keller, 2013); they also inform people’s sense of joint agency.  
                                                 
 
 
3For example, if action outcomes were suspected to be unreliable in Experiment 2, people may 
have instead based their sense of agency on their perception of their how well their partner 
matched the metronome pace. However, this seems unlikely to have occurred given that the 
feedback presented in Experiment 2 was veridical and there were no differences in agency ratings 
depending on task or role. Future research could examine how false feedback influences cue 
weighting in determining the sense of joint agency.  
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The association between higher partner predictability on a given trial (i.e., less variability 
in the partner’s action timing) and stronger joint agency in Experiment 3 has implications for 
research on coordination strategies in joint action. In everyday joint action, “coordination 
smoother” strategies involve modifying one’s own behaviour to facilitate coordination (Vesper, 
Butterfill, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2010). One example of a coordination smoother is reducing the 
temporal variability in one’s own actions to enhance interpersonal coordination by making one’s 
actions more predictable (Vesper, van der Wel, Knoblich, & Sebanz, 2011; Vesper, Schmitz, 
Safra, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016). Findings from Experiment 3 indicate that reduced variability 
of a partner’s actions not only facilitates interpersonal coordination but also increases the strength 
of joint agency. Thus, coordination strategies that utilize predictions to enhance interpersonal 
coordination may also have the added benefit of strengthening joint agency in joint action.  
More broadly, understanding the factors that increase the strength of joint agency has 
implications for contexts in which people strive to achieve a sense of group cohesion. For 
example, Overy and Molnar-Szakacs (2009) suggest that “the feeling of being together” is an 
important component of music therapy. Children with autism spectrum disorder (ASD) may 
benefit from music therapy because it offers a shared affective experience between co-
performers, whereby people are able to extract information about their partner’s actions (Overy & 
Molnar-Szakacs, 2009). Consistent with this hypothesis, the sense of togetherness correlates with 
how well people coordinate their actions with each other, and children with ASD show less 
coordination than typically developing children (Marsh, Richardson, & Schmidt, 2009). 
Similarly, Carron, Shapcott, and Burke (2007) suggest that creating a sense of group identity in 
team sports contributes to group success. Joint agency may therefore arise in joint action in order 
to facilitate interpersonal affiliation or group cohesion. Although joint agency and group 
cohesion appear closely related, further research is needed to investigate how the sense of joint 
agency influences group cohesion.  
Limitations and Future Directions 
One potential avenue for future research is to further explore how different 
leader/follower relationships influence the sense of joint agency. In the experiments presented 
here, the leader was always the person who produced the first tone(s) in the sequence, whereas 
the follower produced the subsequent tone(s) in the sequence. Thus, both partners contributed 
equally to the joint action as well as the joint outcome, and the only difference between roles was 
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who initiated the action. We only found differences in joint agency between leaders and followers 
in Experiment 1 when coordination requirements differed between tasks, suggesting that 
leader/follower differences in our paradigm can be explained by coordination differences 
between the roles. In other studies, leader/follower roles have also included differences in the 
amount that people contribute to the joint action and in the amount of information people have 
access to about the joint goal and how to achieve it. For example, a study by Sacheli, Tidoni, 
Pavone, Aglioti, and Candidi (2013) varied the amount of information leaders and followers had 
access to about the type of action the pair was required to perform to achieve a joint goal. Leaders 
were informed of the joint goal and how to achieve it, whereas followers were simply told to 
coordinate with the leader. This manipulation resulted in diverging action strategies: leaders 
reduced their action variability to make themselves more predictable, whereas followers imitated 
the leaders. The tendency for leaders to make their actions more predictable when followers are 
given less information about the joint action may result in followers feeling more joint agency 
than leaders because they can better predict their partner’s actions. Thus, leader/follower roles 
might have different effects on the sense of joint agency depending on factors such as how much 
each co-performer contributes to the joint goal and the information each role has access to about 
the joint action (cf. Pacherie, 2012). 
  Future research could also address the specific mechanism through which salience of an 
outcome influences the sense of joint agency in Experiment 2. We discussed two reasons for why 
the joint outcome was more salient than perceptual predictions about actions in Experiment 2: a) 
presenting feedback about the outcome before eliciting agency ratings, and b) asking specifically 
about people’s sense of responsibility for the outcome. Together, these two manipulations may 
have increased people’s attention to the joint outcome. However, it is possible that either 
manipulation alone may have been enough to increase the salience of outcome valence. A future 
experiment could examine this possibility by presenting the outcome before the agency rating and 
asking people about their sense of control over the joint action rather than responsibility for the 
joint outcome. If the results of this experiment replicate Experiment 2 (i.e., outcome valence 
influences shared control), this would suggest that presenting a joint outcome before the agency 
rating increases the salience of outcome valence. If results instead replicate Experiment 1 (i.e., 
task and role influence shared control), this would suggest that asking specifically about the 
outcome increases the salience of outcome valence. Future research could also explore how 
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information about an interaction partner can influence the weighting of cues. For example, if a 
person interacts with a partner that is perceived to be an expert, they might deem perceptual 
information about their partner’s action timing as more reliable, and thus rely more on perceptual 
information than they would when interacting with a non-expert to determine their sense of joint 
agency.  
Future studies could also examine the relationship between explicit measures of joint 
agency and implicit measures of agency in joint action. Explicit measures of agency use rating 
scales to directly probe people’s judgments of agency, whereas implicit measures of agency rely 
on perceptual differences between self- and externally-generated action effects (Dewey & 
Knoblich, 2014). Examples include intentional binding, in which self-generated actions and 
effects are perceived as closer together in time than externally-generated actions and effects 
(Moore et al., 2009), and sensory attenuation, in which the sensory effect of an action (i.e., the 
loudness of a tone) is suppressed for self- compared to externally-generated events. Studies of 
agency during joint action have revealed dissociations between explicit and implicit measures. 
For example, Obhi and Hall (2011) examined both explicit ratings of agency and intentional 
binding. They found that although partners’ explicit ratings of agency were polarized to self- or 
other-agency, both partners demonstrated similar intentional binding. Other studies have likewise 
found comparable sensory attenuation between partners for actions produced in interactive 
contexts (Weiss, Herwig, & Schütz-Bosbach, 2011; Strother, House, & Obhi, 2010). These 
findings suggest that people may experience joint agency at a pre-reflective level during joint 
action (Obhi & Hall, 2011). Future studies could examine whether explicit measures of joint 
agency (as opposed to self- or other-agency) are associated with implicit measures of agency for 
jointly-produced action effects, which could indicate that implicit measures tap into joint agency 
rather than self-agency when people engage in joint action.  
 Another intriguing direction for future work involves investigating the neural mechanisms 
that underlie the sense of joint agency. One proposed mechanism of self-agency is suppression of 
the N1 event-related potential (ERP; Lange, 2011). The auditory N1 is a negative going ERP 
component measured at fronto-central regions of the scalp that peaks about 100ms after the onset 
of an auditory event. The N1 is primarily generated by activity in the auditory cortex and frontal 
areas (motor cortex, primary motor areas, and the cingulate gyrus; Giard et al., 1994) and is 
reduced for self-generated compared to externally-generated effects. Loehr (2013) showed that 
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this mechanism may also underlie a self-other distinction in the context of coordinated joint 
action. In this study, N1 suppression was greater for self-produced tones than for jointly-
produced tones. However, jointly-produced tones did show suppression compared to computer-
generated tones (Loehr, 2013). Other research provides evidence that N1 suppression occurs for 
both self- and other-generated tones when people produce their own distinct action effects during 
interaction (Poonian, McFadyen, Ogden, & Cunnington, 2015). Together, these findings support 
the idea that N1 suppression underlies a self-other distinction when actions overlap, but may also 
underlie joint agency when people coordinate to produce their own distinct action effects. Future 
research could examine whether N1 suppression determines whether people feel a sense of joint 
agency, in addition to a sense of self-agency, in a joint action context. Additionally, future 
research could investigate whether N1 suppression differently influences the sense of shared 
control or the sense of shared responsibility in joint action.  
Conclusions 
In sum, the series of experiments presented in this thesis confirmed the theoretical 
prediction that people will experience joint agency when they engage in cooperative joint action. 
We showed that people experience both a sense of shared control over the joint action as well as 
a sense of shared responsibility over the joint outcome. Furthermore, we showed that the sense of 
shared control relies on the predictions people make about self-, other-, and joint-action 
consequences at a perceptual level, providing support for Pacherie’s (2012) framework of joint 
agency. The sense of shared responsibility, however, relied on outcome valence rather than action 
prediction, suggesting that people base their sense of joint agency on cues that are most salient in 
a given situation. Therefore, we suggest that Pacherie’s framework could be extended to include 
theoretical predictions about how cues at different levels of action specification are weighted 
differently depending on their salience.  
Processes that facilitate joint action, such as internal models for self-, other-, and jointly-
produced action effects (Keller et al., in press) and coordination smoother strategies (Vesper et 
al., 2010), may also serve to increase the sense of sense of joint agency people feel. In turn, 
understanding the factors that increase the strength of joint agency has implications for contexts 
in which people strive to achieve a sense of group cohesion. Although more research is needed to 
further elucidate the mechanisms that contribute to the experience of joint agency, the three 
experiments presented here provide the first empirical evidence for how different factors are 
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taken into account and integrated to inform people’s experience of joint agency during joint 
action. 
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